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Abstract
The risks associated with sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) transactions are essentially 
two-fold: political, to the extent that SWFs could be used as the armed wing of States’ 
foreign policy, and economic, since there is a risk of public subsidization or other 
types of market distortions through their investments. It is within this framework that 
the idea of international best practices aimed at a better regulation of SWFs was envis-
aged. This led to the adoption of the “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices” 
for SWFs, also labelled as the “Santiago Principles”. While the Santiago Principles 
may be useful for a better regulation of the relationship between fund managers and 
owners, they are nevertheless absolutely futile for considering and protecting the 
interests of the host States of sovereign investments. Thus, the Santiago Principles 
go against their founding objective. To this extent, the Santiago Principles shall not 
be regarded as a genuine form of international regulation, but rather as a veneer of 
respectability to improve the way recipient States perceive sovereign investors.
1. Introduction
I n 2007, the Republic of Costa Rica and the People’s Republic of China signed a 
confidential memorandum of understanding in which Costa Rica pledged to break its 
diplomatic relationships with Taiwan2  as soon as it established others of the same 
nature with China. In return, China guaranteed to strengthen its bilateral cooperation 
with Costa Rica through several means. These included negotiations on a free trade 
agreement (signed in 2010),3 China’s support to Costa Rica’s candidacy for a non-
permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (which Costa Rica finally held 
1 Professor of Law at Sciences Po Law School (Ecole de Droit de Sciences Po, Paris). The author 
can be reached at: regis.bismuth@sciencespo.fr.
2 Art. I of the Memorando de Entendimiento entre el Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica 
y el Gobierno de la República Popular China sobre el Establecimiento de Relaciones Diplomáticas 
(1 June 2007) (published in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Memoria Institucional 2008–
2009 (San José, 8 May 2009) 148–150.
3 Memorando de Entendimiento (n 2) Art. III-3. This free trade agreement was eventually con-
cluded on 8 April 2010 and entered into force on 1 August 2011 <http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CRI_
CHN_FTA/Texts_Apr2010_e/CRI_CHN_ToC_e.asp#PDF> accessed 28 January 2016.
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between 2008 and 2009),4 and other political as well as trivial underhand dealings.5 
The agreement also included a pecuniary section in which China committed to provide 
$130 million in non-repayable financial aid,6 and to purchase $300 million of Costa 
Rican treasury bonds.7 China’s fulfilment of the latter obligation has lifted the veil on 
that agreement. The press was willing to discover the circumstances and conditions 
of these acquisitions. The Chinese and Costa Rican authorities, having refused to 
publish the memorandum, put forward a confidentiality obligation. The daily paper 
La Nación appealed that decision, and filed a writ of amparo before the Costa Rican 
constitutional court in order to rule in favour of the memorandum’s publication. Bas-
ing its decision on the citizen’s right to information, particularly in public finance, 
the Court ruled that all agreements concerning the purchase of treasury bonds should 
be made public.8
Th is is how the practical details of this operation were unveiled. The Costa Rican 
bonds were purchased by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an 
opaque entity whose mission is to invest Chinese foreign exchange reserves. For a 
long time, SAFE has refused to admit the existence of subsidiaries in offshore finan-
cial centres from which it makes some of its investments, which it also refuses to 
make public.9 SAFE, one of the main two Chinese sovereign wealth funds in terms 
of assets under management,10 has thus become the armed wing of Beijing’s foreign 
policy and, more precisely, of its diplomatic offensive against Taiwan.11  Beyond its 
interest in terms of separation of powers or transparency of national foreign policy, 
this affair sheds light on one of many issues raised by SWFs, which can be defined 
simply as investment vehicles that are created, funded and controlled by States.12
4 Memorando de Entendimiento (n 2) Art. III-7.
5 Inter alia: provision of twenty scholarship grants to study in China (article III-4), promotion of 
Chinese tourism in Costa Rica (article III-5), promotion of Chinese investments in Costa Rica (article 
III-6) and support of Costa Rica’s participation in APEC (article III-7).
6 Memorando de Entendimiento (supra n 2), Art. III-1.
7 Ibid., Art. III-2.
8 Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Expediente n° 08–003718–0007-CO, 
Sentencia nº 2008–013658 (5 September 2008) <http://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional> 
accessed 28 January 2016.
9 Jamil Anderlini, Secretive Beijing Agency Uses Forex Reserves to Isolate Taiwan Financial 
Times (12 September 2008).
10 On SAFE activities, see, Yann Marin, Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds: Past, Present and 
Future 9 Revue d’Économie Financière 105 (2009).
11 Eric Helleiner, The Geopolitics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: An Introduction 14 Geopolitics 302 
(2009); Jean-Marc Puel, Les fonds souverains – Instruments financiers ou armes politiques? 72 et seq 
(Paris; Editions Autrement, 2009).
12 There is neither an accepted legal definition of sovereign wealth funds in international law nor 
even a purely descriptive definition that has reached a broad consensus (Edwin M Truman, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds – Threat or Salvation? 9 et seq. (Washington, D.C.; Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2010); Andrew Rozanov, Definitional Challenges of Dealing with Sovereign Wealth Funds 
1 Asian Journal of International Law 251 (2010)). However, the main definitions of sovereign wealth 
funds suggested by various authors or by public or private entities have put into perspective three key 
elements highlighting their connection to their States of origin: they are created, controlled and funded 
by States. The definition adopted by the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
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The context of this affair is also very telling. While it caused great political stir in 
Costa Rica,13 it went relatively unnoticed elsewhere. Indeed, it was simultaneous 
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which made the international financial system 
falter.14 States were more afraid that SWFs would liquidate their investments. 
Besides, Lehman Brothers’ filing for bankruptcy was announced after negotiations 
with several SWFs for its recapitalization failed.15 However, Chinese diplomats were 
very upset by the bad press – though it was toned down by the crisis – the SAFE 
received, at a time when its other sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Cor-
poration (CIC), redoubled its efforts to be considered a serious and respectable inves-
tor solely guided by the profitability of its investments.16
Ch inese authorities’ irritation could be understood in the context of global mistrust 
and suspicion towards SWFs prevalent before the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, those 
funds had carried out a few operations that had nonetheless provoked some turmoil 
(e.g. CIC’s acquisition of Blackstone and Morgan Stanley shares in 2007).17 Further-
more, cross-border investment projects led by public corporations – which were not 
sovereign wealth funds – in highly sensitive fields (e.g. American harbour projects 
led by the Dubai Ports World corporation in 2006 or the American oil company, 
Unocal, led by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation) faced strong political 
opposition in the United States for national security reasons, and consequently failed.18 
Besides, the American legislation concerning foreign investments control was 
amended as a result of those events.19
(IWGSF) established in 2008 provides: “SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or 
arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic 
purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives. … The SWFs are 
commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the 
proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports”; IWGSF, 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (Santiago Principles) (October 2008) (Appendix I (Defin-
ing Sovereign Wealth Funds), n° 2) <http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf> accessed 
28 January 2016 [hereinafter “Santiago Principles”]. See also, Régis Bismuth, Les fonds souverains face 
au droit international – Panorama des problèmes juridiques posés par des investisseurs peu ordinaires 
56 Annuaire Français de Droit International 571 (2010).
13 Álvaro Murillo, Gobierno mintió al país sobre venta de bonos a China La Nación (11 Septem-
ber 2008); Costa Rica: Le président Arias reconnaît avoir menti à propos de Taïwan Agence France 
Presse (13 September 2008).
14 Puel (n 11) 72.
15 Chip Cummins and Evan Ramstad, Crisis on Wall Street: Sovereign Funds Choose to Wait The 
Wall Street Journal (16 September 2008).
16 Andrew Batson, China Used its Reserves to Win Over Costa Rica The Wall Street Journal Asia 
(15 September 2008).
17 Friedrich Wu and Arifin Seah, The Rise of China Investment Corporation: A New Member of 
the Sovereign Wealth Club 9(2) World Economics 45 (2008).
18 Puel (n 11) 46; Colleen Baker, Sovereign Wealth Funds, in Finance Ethics – Critical Issues in 
Theory and Practice 253 (New York; Wiley, 2010).
19 The United States amended their foreign investment review procedure carried out by the Com-
mittee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS). Originally, this committee, created in 
1975, was only an advisory committee chaired by the Secretary of Treasury (Locknie Hsu, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, Recent US Legislative Changes, and Treaty Obligations 43 Journal of World Trade 455 
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Recipient States have a somewhat schizophrenic attitude towards sovereign wealth 
funds. These investors are considered to be, on the one hand, white knights in shining 
armour for the rescue of an ailing financial sector and, on the other, a Trojan horse 
for a rather dubious foreign policy. The hopes, fears and fantasies they generate are 
probably exacerbated by the image of the decreasing influence of Western countries 
on the international scene their growing importance reflects. However, the use by 
States of their economic power for foreign policy purposes is not new; it is certainly 
a permanent feature of international relations.20  Yet, the development of sovereign 
wealth funds deeply modifies the way economic influence is exercised. Such influence 
does not operate through traditional diplomatic channels or unofficial equivalents. 
Instead, it relies on liberalization mechanisms of international investments that were 
created to support operations carried out by economic players which are supposed to 
be driven by financial motivations. Hence, it is legitimate to wonder whether States 
can be regarded as ordinary foreign investors when it comes to sovereign wealth 
funds. This perspective likely constitutes the keystone of the issues related to these 
actors. It does not, however, exhaust the problems that need to be addressed, since 
their activities raise several unprecedented legal issues. Such issues are to be found 
in the fields of financial stability, market integrity, monetary management, corporate 
governance, competition rules and human rights. Revisiting frequently preconceived 
ideas about SWFs requires a brief outline of such issues.
Fi rstly, sovereign funds may pursue aims that do not necessarily guide their own-
ers’ interests directly. Beyond expensive “prestigious” or “trophy” assets, such as 
soccer clubs or luxury brands,21 some sovereign wealth funds want to make sure that 
they invest in firms respectful of fundamental rights and engaged in honourable 
activities. This is the case for the Norwegian fund Government Pension Fund – Global 
which has a “Council on Ethics” that targets its investments and rules out acquisition 
of tobacco-producing companies, firms participating in the production of weapons 
prohibited by international humanitarian law or involved in corruption activities, 
(2009)). A first reform (the 1988 Exon-Florio amendment) empowered the President to freeze transac-
tions when there was “credible evidence to support a belief that the foreign interest exercising control 
of the US person to be acquired might take action that threatens to impair the national security” (31 
CFR § 800.501(2)). The Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) amended this procedure 
in 2007 in order to improve its transparency. Furthermore, this new regulation broadened the scope of 
CFIUS control on the basis of new factors (transactions run by a foreign government-controlled entity, 
withdrawal of the 10% minimum limit of capital, etc.) thereby covering most of the transactions car-
ried out by SWFs (Fabio Bassan, Host States and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Between National Security 
and International Law 21 European Business Law Review 185 (2010) (noting that before 2007 “SWF 
activities remained exempt from the application of this rule because in most cases these funds invest 
in shares without voting rights or purchase non-controlling interest, below 10% of the capital stock”)).
20 See Régis Bismuth, L’internationalisation du capitalisme d’État en question – Les failles de 
l’encadrement juridique des risques politiques et économiques posés par les investissements souverains 
étrangers (entreprises d’État et fonds souverains) 45 Études internationales 381 (2014). 
21 Puel (n11) 85–86. For instance, the acquisition by the Libyan Investment Authority of a 7,5% 
stake in the Juventus Football Club, enabling one of Muammar Gaddafi’s son to start his career as a 
football player in Italy; Lina Saigol, Opaque Libyan Fund Built Diverse Portfolio Financial Times (21 
February 2011).
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massive human rights violations or damages caused to the environment.22 S ome of 
its disinvestments were particularly resounding, especially the blacklisting of the 
American corporation Wal-Mart in 2006 for “complicity in serious or systematic 
violations of internationally recognised standards for human rights and labour rights,”23 
a decision that provoked vivid protests by the United States ambassador to Norway 
who accused the fund of trying to export its ethical standards.24
Secondly, sovereign funds do not only carry out investments abroad, but also invest 
in domestic markets. France indeed has at least two entities which form or resemble 
a sovereign wealth fund: the Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (Retirement Fund) 
created in 1999 and the Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement (Strategic Investment 
Fund) created in 2008.25 The latter, commonly designated as a “French-style SWF”,26 
invests in small or medium-sized companies as well as in strategic sectors in order to 
secure the structure of their shareholding and to protect national jobs. The economic 
conditions of these investments can thus generate competition distortions that could 
be taken into account from the perspective of both WTO and EU rules.27
Third ly, even respectable sovereign wealth funds may be criticised for activities 
regarded as contentious. The aforementioned Norwegian fund Government Pension 
Fund – Global, considered as the most transparent fund by various international rank-
ings that bloomed in recent years,28 has been publicly criticised by Reykjavik for 
22 Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment From Multinational Corporations for 
Human Rights Violations – The Case of the Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund 23 American University 
International Law Review 577 (2009).
23 Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Pension Fund – Global, Annual Report (2006) 27.
24 Chesterman (22) 612; Truman (n 12) 41; Eric C Anderson, Take the Money and Run – Sover-
eign Wealth Funds and the Demise of American Prosperity 127 (Santa Barbara, CA; Praeger, 2009). 
Conversely, this Norwegian fund has also decided to consider as an acceptable an investment in the 
American corporation L-3 Communications following its decision to stop producing components neces-
sary to cluster munitions prohibited by the 2008 Oslo Convention. This decision was based on a rec-
ommendation of its Council on Ethics (Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Pension Fund – Global, 
Recommendation (15 November 2010) <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FIN/etikk/2011/l3_eng.pdf> 
accessed 28 January 2016). More recently, the Council of Ethics decided to put the Brazilian company 
Petrobras under observation due to the risk of gross corruption (Council on Ethics – The Government 
Pension Fund – Global, Recommendation to Put a Company in the Government Pension Fund Global 
under Observation: Petroleo Brasileiro SA (21 December 2015) <http://etikkradet.no/files/2016/01/
Recommendation-Petrobras-21-December-2015.pdf> accessed 28 January 2016).
25 Puel (n11) 20.
26 Jean Arthuis and Philippe Marini, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Potential and Conditions for Part-
nerships 9 Revue d’Économie Financière 322 (2009).
27 See Bismuth (n 12) 598. Besides, the European Commission decided in 2010 to launch an 
investigation concerning investments carried out by the French Strategic Investment Fund (State Aid – 
Commission Opens In-Depth Inquiry into €55 Million Investment into French Car Component Supplier 
Trèves, IP/10/100 (29 January 2010)). Eventually, after its investigation, the Commission found that 
these transactions did not constitute State aid under Art. 107(1) TFEU (European Commission Decision 
of 20 April 2011 on Suspected Aid to the Company Trèves C 4/10 (ex NN 64/09) Implemented by the 
French Republic, 2011/676/EU (9 October 2011)).
28 Sarah Bagnall and Edwin M Truman, Progress on Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency and 
Accountability: An Updated SWF Scoreboard 3 Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy 
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having massively sold Icelandic bonds in 2006, a few months after their purchase, 
thus generating a short financial crisis.29 This operation had been carried out despite 
the existence of a “Nordic mutual-defence pact against financial destabilization”, the 
latter being recalled by the Prime Minister of Iceland as an unfriendly act on the side 
Norway.30
Therefore, the risks associated with SWFs are essentially two-fold: political and 
economic. The risks are political to the extent that SWFs could be used as the armed 
wing of States’ foreign policy or could lead to concerns related to national security. 
From an economic standpoint, beyond financial stability issues, there is a risk of 
public subsidisation or other types of market distortions through SWF investments. 
This has led several recipient States to intensify their screening procedures for the 
admission of sovereign investments.31 While international trade and investment 
agreements authorise States to restrict trade and investment flows for national security 
reasons, they happen to be insufficient since it is almost impossible to prove or rea-
sonably anticipate that, at the time of their admission, investments made in sensitive 
sectors and industries (for instance energy, military, telecommunications, etc.) are in 
reality prompted by political agendas instead of financial reasons.32 It is within this 
framework that the G7 in 2007 envisaged international best practices for better regu-
lation of SWFs. This led to the adoption of the “Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices” for SWFs, also labelled as the “Santiago Principles.”33
Surprisingly, the vast majority of the literature is either extremely laudatory about 
the Santiago Principles34 or d oes not target the main flaws of this instrument.35 A 
m e ticulous analysis of these principles requires a closer scrutiny beyond the stamp 
Brief No. 13–19 (August 2013); Sven Behrendt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago Principles: 
Where Do They Stand? 3 Carnegie Paper No. 22 (2010) <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/santiago_
principles.pdf> accessed 28 January 2016.
29 Truman (n 12) 41; Daniel W Drezner, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Insecurity of Global 
Finance 62 Journal of International Affairs 118 (2008).
30 Asset-Backed Insecurity – Sovereign Wealth Funds The Economist (19 January 2008).
31 See Bismuth (n 12) 589.
32 For an overview of the issues, see Bismuth (n 20) 383–394; Bismuth (n 12) 592–602.
33 See Santiago Principles (n 12).
34 Donghyun Park and Gemma Esther Estrada, Developing Asia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: The 
Santiago Principles and the Case for Self Regulation 1 Asian Journal of International Law 383 (2011).
35 Joseph J Norton, The “Santiago Principles” for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case Study on Inter-
national Financial Standard-Setting Processes 13 Journal of International Economic Law 645 (2010); 
Maurizia De Bellis, Global Standards for Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Quest for Transparency 1 Asian 
Journal of International Law 349 (2011); Georges Kratsas and Jon Truby, Regulating Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to Avoid Investment Protectionism 1 Journal of Financial Regulation 95 (2015); Anthony Wong, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Problem of Asymmetric Information: The Santiago Principles and 
International Regulations 34 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1081 (2009). However, the latter 
article is the only one pointing out that the Santiago Principles are “too focused on SWFs as entities 
and not enough on their relationship with recipient countries” (1105), one major criticism discussed in 
this article. For a more nuanced approach and a critical analysis of the Santiago Principles, see Eliza 
Malathouni, The Informality of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Santiago 
Principles: A Conscious Choice or a Necessity?, in Informal International Law Making: Case Studies, 
251 (Berlin; Torkel Opsahl 2012).
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of “international standard for SWFs” they have – unduly – received. Rather, it should 
highlight that they do not live up to the expectation of effectively regulating SWF 
activities. This analysis focuses on three aspects. First, it is important to revisit the 
drafting history of the Santiago Principles since it sheds light on a regulatory capture 
by the funds themselves which deliberately prevented its possible multilateralisation 
to better include the interests of the host States (see Section 2). Second, an analysis 
of the Principles themselves clearly indicates that their content is inadequate to 
address the concerns raised by the activities of the funds, particularly when it comes 
to protecting host State national security or ensuring investment transparency (see 
Section 3). Third, the Santiago Principles have also proven to present significant 
deficiencies concerning the institutional framework dedicated to their promotion and 
implementation (see Section 4). Ultimately, it appears that the Santiago Principles 
constitute more the product of a public relations strategy than a genuine example of 
international regulation (see Section 5).
2. The Santiago Principles: A Suspect Drafting Process
The development of the Santiago Principles was carried out in a surprisingly expedi-
tious way and only involved a very limited number of actors.36 These principles 
originated in a context of growing mistrust towards investments made in Western 
countries by SWFs, particularly those from China and the Middle East. However, this 
vivid reluctance should not eclipse the favourable consideration SWFs received at 
the same time by certain actors and political bodies in the same countries. This 
ambivalence, especially blatant in the United States, is at the origin of the core defi-
ciencies of the Santiago Principles.
A few months before the adoption of the Santiago Principles, a significant asym-
metry existed between the US legislative and executive branches’ positions. The US 
Congress had proven to be reluctant, if not hostile, towards sovereign investments, 
regardless of whether they were carried out by SWFs or State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). Besides, it took several initiatives in order to exert more stringent control 
over foreign investments in the US.37
As to the executive branch, while the Bush administration expressed some con-
cerns about certain acquisitions by sovereign investors from the Middle East, it had 
proven to be more open and benevolent to Asia and more particularly China, with 
which it was willing to develop economic ties. This more favourable stance can be 
explained by Wall Street’s influence within the US executive branch. US financial 
institutions perceived SWFs as a vast source of liquidity for their recapitalisation after 
the beginning of the subprime crisis in early 2007. It is therefore no coincidence that 
the main architect of international initiatives eventually leading to the adoption of the 
Santiago Principles was none other than Henry Paulson, then US Secretary of Trea-
36 For a detailed history of the drafting process of the Santiago Principles, see Norton (n 35) 645.
37 See supra n 19.
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sury. Paulson spent most of his career at an investment bank, Goldman Sachs, starting 
in 1974. He served as a chairman between 1999 and 2006, before taking up his new 
position within the Bush administration.38 Besides, it is widely known that Henry 
Paulson had forged privileged economic ties with China, a country he visited more 
than seventy times during his time at Goldman Sachs.39
It was indeed Henry Paulson that proposed that the G7 include international regu-
lation of SWFs on its agenda in October 2007, just before the annual meeting of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Initially, the G7 invited the 
IMF, the World Bank and the OECD to develop guidelines for SWFs. In this respect, 
the G7 Statement noted:
“SWFs are increasingly important participants in the international fi nancial system 
and […] our economies can benefi t from openness to SWF investment fl ows. We 
see merit in identifying best practices for SWFs in such areas as institutional 
structure, risk management, transparency and accountability. For recipients of 
government-controlled investments, we think it is important to build on principles 
such as non-discrimination, transparency, and predictability […]. We ask the IMF, 
World Bank, and OECD to examine these issues […].”40
Eventually, the World Bank played no role within this framework and the work pro-
gram revolved around two main areas: OECD guidelines for recipient States of sov-
ereign investment,41 and IMF international standards for better SWF regulation and 
reassurance that investments were driven by economic objectives. With regard to the 
IMF, the first debates were held within its International Monetary and Financial Com-
mittee (IMFC)42 at the end of 2007, but there had been serious calls that challenged 
the organization’s legitimacy. This was particularly clear in the statement made at the 
IMFC by the Governor of the United Arab Emirates Central Bank on behalf of a 
constituency of Middle East countries. He surprisingly questioned the IMF expertise 
38 Norton (n 35) 650.
39 See for instance, Paulson Urges China to Continue With Currency Reforms The Wall Street 
Journal (2 December 2008); Zheng Wang, What Bush Did Right – On China The Washington Times 
A21 (19 February 2009) (noting about Paulson that, while at the head of Goldman Sachs, “his time on 
Chinese soil has been spent cultivating relationships, understanding the Chinese mentality, and creat-
ing the necessary cultural fluency required to build a successful bridge of communication between the 
two powerful nations”). See also, Henry M Paulson, Dealing with China: An Insider Unmasks the New 
Economic Superpower, xii (New York; Twelve, 2015).
40 G7, Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington (19 October 
2007) <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm071019.htm> accessed 28 January 2016.
41 OECD, OECD Guidance on Recipient Country Policies towards SWFs (11 October 2008) <http://
www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/oecdguidanceonsovereignwealthfunds.htm> accessed 28 
January 2016.
42 The IMFC is an IMF body providing guidance to the IMF Executive Board. See, Alexander Sha-
kow, The Role of the International Monetary and Financial Committee in IMF Governance, Independent 
Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund (Background Paper BP/08/03) (May 2008) <http://
www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP08_03.pdf> accessed 28 January 2016.
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as well as its ability to develop international standards for SWFs. The Governor 
expressed that such an initiative could affect investments in the delicate context of 
the emerging subprime crisis, thereby threatening recipient States. He openly pointed 
out:
“we reiterate our misgivings regarding the Fund’s involvement in setting best 
practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). The Fund does not have the req-
uisite expertise in the areas of governance and transparency to take the lead in 
producing a set of best practices for SWFs. We are also concerned that the treat-
ment of SWFs, to the exclusion of other types of institutional investors with proven 
track record of excessive risk taking and destabilizing behavior, would introduce 
a severe element of bias and lack evenhandedness in fi nancial surveillance. Finally, 
the timing of this exercise and its political dimensions could inadvertently disrupt 
the fl ow of much-needed long-term capital from SWFs to institutions in the U.S. 
and elsewhere that face both liquidity and capital shortage issues.”43
The IMFC eventually surrendered to the threats of this group of States, letting them 
develop a set of standards for SWFs. It is in this context that in 2008 the International 
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWGSWF) was established by these 
States – and not by the IMFC – to create an international standard. The IMF was only 
a host to this group and did not intervene in any way in its work. This explains the 
confusion surrounding the origin of the Santiago Principles. The establishment of the 
Working Group was decided within (and not by) the IMF and the latter only offered 
administrative assistance to facilitate its work.44 Thus, on the face of it, the IMF gave 
its multilateral imprimatur to the IWGSWF which solely reflects the plurilateral 
interests of the funds.
Among the 26 SWFs represented within the IWGSWF, some of them had only 
very little economic and financial clout.45 While the membership of the IWGSWF 
was thus characterised by the heterogeneity of its members, this should not eclipse 
their common objective of limiting the scope of the regulation. The rapidity at which 
the Santiago Principles were developed is surprising since they intended to address 
a sensitive issue for which long-lasting negotiations between different stakeholders 
would have been necessary. Indeed, only three meetings held over five months were 
sufficient to reach an agreement and adopt the Generally Accepted Principles and 
43 IMF, Statement by Statement by His Excellency Sultan N Al-Suwaidi Governor of the United 
Arab Emirates Central Bank (On behalf of Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mal-
dives, Oman, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), IMFC 17th Meeting, 6 (12 April 2008) 
<https://www.imf.org/External/spring/2008/imfc/statement/eng/uae.pdf> accessed 28 January 2016.
44 The IMFC noted that it “welcomes the IMF’s initiative to work, as facilitator and coordina-
tor, with SWFs to develop a set of best practices by the 2008 Annual Meetings” (Communiqué of 
the IMFC of the Board of Governors of the IMF (12 April 2008) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/
cm/2008/041208.htm> accessed 28 January 2016).
45 For instance, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ireland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and 
Tobago. See, Santiago Principles (n 12) 1.
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Practices (GAPP) for SWFs, labelled the “Santiago Principles” after the third and last 
meeting of the Working Group held in the Chilean capital. In that respect, five months 
could be considered as “a very quick period of time for [the development of] an inter-
national code.”46
Another element shows the extent to which the Santiago Principles mainly reflected 
the interests of sovereign funds. The Working Group was comprised of about twenty 
“member countries” represented by their funds and government officials.47 Two funds 
established by a federated State of the US as well as a Canadian province were con-
sidered as representatives of their country of origin48 and, in that respect, the Santiago 
Principles indicated that Canada and the US were considered as “member countries” 
of the Working Group.49 However, it was specifically stated that the Working Group 
“also benefited from the input from a number of recipient countries” including France, 
Germany and the UK (which were not “represented” via a fund within the Working 
Group), but also Canada and the United States,50 suggesting that the interests of the 
latter two were at the same time represented through a different diplomatic channel. 
It is therefore obvious that a clear distinction existed within the Working Group 
between the “member countries” that genuinely represented the interests of the funds 
and the invited recipient countries which attended meetings but played no substantial 
role in devising the Principles. This is why the Santiago Principles should be regarded 
more as a form of self-regulation.
The development of an international standard, irrespective of its legally binding 
dimension, shall ideally be based on the equitable participation of all stakeholders51 
and be developed by bodies whose membership is open and not restricted to a limited 
number of States.52 Given the rat her passive role of recipient countries in the process 
46 David Murray, Negotiating a Voluntary Code, in The Role of State Capital in the New Financial 
Order, 151 (London; Imperial College Press, 2011).
47 Santiago Principles (n 12) 28.
48 The Alaska Permanent Fund for the United States, and the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 
for Canada.
49 Santiago Principles (n 12) 1 (n 2).
50 Santiago Principles (n 12) 2.
51 See Thomas Perroud, Standardisation internationale privée et Global Administrative Law, in 
La standardisation internationale privée – Aspects juridiques, 185 (Brussels; Larcier, 2014); Lucy 
Koechlin and Richard Calland, Standard Setting at the Cutting Edge: an Evidence-Based Typology 
for Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives, in Non-State Actors as Standard Setters, 84 (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
52 The open membership of standard-setting bodies is a key requirement when identifying an inter-
national standard according to WTO agreements. The SPS Agreement indeed refers to standards “prom-
ulgated by other relevant international organizations open for membership to all Members” (Annex A, 
Art. 3(d)). In the GATS, international standards are adopted by “relevant international organization” 
defined as international bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Mem-
bers of the WTO” (Art. VI:5(b) n 3). On this issue, see Régis Bismuth, Financial Sector Regulation 
and Financial Services Liberalization at the Crossroads: The Relevance of International Financial 
Standards in WTO Law 44 Journal of World Trade 489 (2010). See also, United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, Report of the Appellate 
Body (16 May 2012), WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R, paras 343–401.
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of development of the Santiago Principles and the strictly plurilateral dimension of 
the Working Group, it is inconceivable to consider the GAPP as a genuine interna-
tional standard. At the same time, it is unfortunate to regard GAPP as an IMF standard, 
as the economic press did after their adoption.53 Arguably, the ambiguity revolving 
around the IMF-paternity of the Santiago Principles has conferred a veneer of legiti-
macy on them. This façade suited the Principles, as it tempered the concerns of West-
ern States – in particular, the United States.54 Beyond these aspects which suggest 
that the Santiago Principles are also are a part of a broader public relations strategy, 
the strict plurilateral dimension of their development essentially focused on the inter-
ests of the funds. This had an impact on the content of this self-regulation, since the 
concerns of recipient States were completely neglected.
3. The Santiago Principles: An Inadequate Regulation
It is unnecessary to provide an exhaustive analysis of the – quite poorly drafted – 24 
Santiago Principles adopted by the SWFs. Instead, it is useful to shed light on their 
deficiencies. Indeed, they do not address the main concerns that the recipient States 
have expressed and which are at the origin of the same principles, mainly the possi-
bility of using SWFs for political ends, and the risks of economic distortions. In order 
to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Santiago Principles, it is first necessary to resort 
to a corporate governance matrix analysis (3.1). Indeed, this will be helpful to then 
conceptualise the relations between the fund and the fund owner (as a shareholder) 
(3.2), and those between the fund and the recipient States of the fund’s investments 
(as stakeholders) (3.3).
3.1. Using the Corporate Governance Matrix Analysis
Assessing the relevance of the Santiago Principles first requires to better understand 
the nature of the relations among the different actors involved. In this respect, SWF 
regulation involves three main categories of actors: the owner of the fund (the State), 
the fund itself (acting through its managers), and the recipient State. These different 
categories of actors are not necessarily all interacting with one another. Two types of 
relations are mainly observable: 1) between the fund and its owner, and 2) between 
the fund and recipient States of its investments.
53 See, for example, Robin Wigglesworth, IMF Guidelines Spur Steps Towards Transparency 
Financial Times (18 March 2010) (noting that “this led the International Monetary Fund to develop 
‘best practices’ for SWFs to improve their transparency and governance. … The IMF guidelines, known 
as the Santiago Principles, are voluntary but many funds are tentatively responding to calls for more 
openness”).
54 Doug Palmer, Rise of China State-Owned Firms Rattles US Companies Reuters News (17 August 
2011) (“A year-long negotiation led by the International Monetary Fund resulted in the so-called San-
tiago Principles, a voluntary set of ‘best practices’ for sovereign wealth funds that has helped dampen 
the concerns in the United States”).
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In this light, it is tempting to draw a parallel between the issues related to the 
regulation of SWFs and those related to corporate governance. Corporate governance 
clarifies the relations among three categories of actors: between the shareholders and 
the management of the firm (where shareholders and managers could have divergent 
interests and the objective is to ensure that managers act in the shareholders’ best 
interest), and between the firm and all its stakeholders (such as employees, suppliers 
or creditors). In an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, the core objective 
is the maximisation of shareholder value and the governance structure mainly focuses 
on the shareholder/manager nexus, and the conflicts inherent in the relation between 
the two.55 The continent al European corporate governance model perceives the firm 
not only as a contract between shareholders, but more broadly as an institution with 
an impact on various stakeholders – whose interests must also be taken into consid-
eration.56
An analysis of the Santiago Principles clearly shows that, through a corporate 
governance matrix analysis, it is essentially the interests of the fund owner, as share-
holders, that are duly taken into consideration. However, the relation between the 
fund and its owner – which is purely a domestic policy issue – has no importance 
when it comes to address the concerns raised by SWFs at the international level.
3.2. The Futility of the Principles Regulating the Relations Between the Fund and 
the Fund Owner
The Santiago Principles include several rules on the relations between the fund and 
the fund owner. Surprisingly, these rules do not restrict in any way the possibility for 
the owner of influencing the investment policy of the fund. They rather aim at assert-
ing the shareholder rights of the owner and ensuring its protection through a control 
of the fund managers. In that respect, “the owner should set the objectives of the 
SWF”,57 its investment policy and strategy,58 and “appoint the members of its govern-
ing bod(ies).”59 Other principles are dedicated to ensuring a greater transparency of 
the fund towards its owner and more specifically rules concerning the scope of infor-
mation that shall be made available to the owner. Indeed, “the relevant statistical data 
pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a timely basis to the owner”,60 and that 
“data should be treated with customary confidentiality by the national agencies as set 
out in the statistical [sic] law/regulation(s).”61 Moreover, the SWF should be audited 
55 Christine A Mallin, Corporate Governance, 15 (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2013). See also 
Christopher M Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World – The Political Foundations 
of Shareholder Power, 28–107 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2013).
56 Mallin (n 55) 20.
57 GAPP 7.
58 GAPP 18.
59 GAPP 7.
60 GAPP 5.
61 GAPP 5 (Commentary) (Santiago Principles (n 12) 15).
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annually,62 and the “external audit report prepared by an independent commercial 
auditor should be submitted to the owner.”63 Other principles have a solely domestic 
outreach. For instance, it is provided that SWF’s activities having significant direct 
domestic macroeconomic implications should be coordinated with the domestic fiscal 
and monetary authorities.64
These principles are particularly interesting when it comes to the protection of the 
fund owner from any form of mismanagement by the fund managers. The operational 
management of the fund must implement the investment strategy devised by the 
owner,65 follow the rules and procedures regarding “the SWF’s general approach to 
funding, withdrawal, and spending operations”,66 and operate within a sound risk 
management framework.67 These rules establishing specific procedures concerning 
the use of the fund’s assets are also useful in order to protect the fund from its owner 
when the latter is likely to divert the assets for domestic political ends.68 Likewise, 
such rules have a purely domestic focus and do not take into consideration the inter-
ests of recipient States of SWF investments.
Moreover, while certain authors have praised the Santiago Principles69 for insist-
ing on the independence that the operational management should enjoy from the fund 
owner,70 such rules are of no interest if the fund managers are willing to follow the 
instructions of governmental authorities. Notably, the Santiago Principles recognize 
the right of the owner to appoint the members of its governing bodies,71 but do not 
include any rule guaranteeing the organic or functional independence of the fund 
managers, similar to that of an independent financial regulatory authority or a central 
bank. It shall also be recalled that a SWF is very different from a private investment 
fund (pension fund, hedge fund or private equity fund). Indeed, in the latter, the rela-
tion between the fund provider (the subscriber) and the fund manager is contractual 
in nature and, in most cases, a subscriber’s financial contribution represents only a 
minority of the managed funds. Conversely, the relation between the SWF and its 
owner is hierarchical and institutional in nature, as the State establishes the fund, 
appoints its managers, defines its investment policy and is its exclusive financial 
contributor. In this regard, the SWF can be seen as an outgrowth of the State. This 
exclusive proprietary ownership dimension of SWFs radically contrasts with the 
conflict of interest issues that corporate or fund managers might have with sharehold-
62 GAPP 12.
63 GAPP 12 (Commentary) (Santiago Principles (n 12) 18).
64 GAPP 3.
65 GAPP 9.
66 GAPP 4.
67 GAPP 22.
68 Loch Adamson, Sovereign Wealth Funds Starting to Embrace Transparency Institutional Investor 
Magazine (1 September 2011) (noting that “Botswana’s Pula Fund observed that transparency mitigated 
the potential use of the fund by politicians for development projects against the spirit of saving for 
future generations and has helped created the checks and balances needed for preservation of capital”).
69 Park and Estrada (n 34) 397; De Bellis (n 35) 375; Wong (n 35) 1104.
70 See, GAPP 6, GAPP 9 and GAPP 16.
71 GAPP 7.
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ers or subscribers. In conclusion, the Principles regulating the relations between the 
SWF and its owner are futile. Likewise, the Principles pertaining to the relations 
between the SWF and recipient States are immaterial.
3.3. The Irrelevance of the Principles on the Relations between the Fund and the 
Recipient States
The few rules included in the Santiago Principles – seemingly – related to the rela-
tions between the SWFs and the host States of their investments are formulated in 
excessively lax or open-ended terms. Moreover, a careful analysis of these rules 
shows a significant gap between the intention stated in the Principle on the one hand, 
and the way the Working Group intended to interpret the Principle on the other. In 
this regard, the “explanation and commentary” sections of the Santiago Principles are 
extremely useful.
For example, GAPP 14 provides that “dealing with third parties for the purpose of 
the SWF’s operational management should be based on economic and financial 
grounds, and follow clear rules and procedures”, while GAPP 19 notes that “the 
SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns 
in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and based on economic and finan-
cial grounds”. Both Principles seem to suggest that SWFs shall seek to maximise their 
financial performance and refuse to carry out investments for political purposes. 
However, the way the Working Group interpreted these principles suggests otherwise. 
According to the Working Group, GAPP 14 seeks “to ensure good governance and 
efficient use of resources.”72 It is therefore a pure internal governance rule aimed at 
preventing the misuse or the excessive use of SWF financial resources. Despite being 
seemingly a principle applicable to the relation between the fund and stakeholders, it 
seeks to regulate the relation between the fund and its owner. Likewise, while GAPP 
19 indicates that only economic and financial considerations should be taken into 
account in investment decisions, the Working Group interpreted this principle differ-
ently. Indeed, “subprinciple” GAPP 19–1 provides that “if investment decisions are 
subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly 
set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed”. In that respect, its com-
mentary refers to an investment policy taking only social, environmental, ethical or 
religious reasons into consideration73 since it would be extremely naïve to expect 
that SWFs publicly disclose the geopolitical motives of their investments.74
72 GAPP 14 (Explanation and commentary) provides that “to ensure good governance and effi-
cient use of resources, it is important that the SWF, its owners, or the entities in charge of the SWF’s 
operational management establish clear rules and procedures for dealing with third parties” (Santiago 
Principles (n 12) 19).
73 GAPP 19–1 (Explanation and commentary) (Santiago Principles (n 12) 22).
74 It is also noteworthy that “subprinciple” GAPP 19–2 (“the management of an SWF’s assets 
should be consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management principles”) simply 
rephrases GAPP 14. Besides, the commentary of “subprinciple” GAPP 19–2 underlines that “the process 
of authorization and incurrence, and amounts paid, should be transparent to its owner or its governing 
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Other provisions also confirm this impression of the double-talk dimension of the 
Santiago Principles. By stressing that “SWF operations and activities in host countries 
should be conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure 
requirements of the countries in which they operate”, GAPP 15 merely reiterates the 
obvious obligation that, absent an explicit waiver, all investors have to comply with 
domestic regulations of host countries. Besides, international investment agreements 
usually provide that treaty protection is limited to investments that have been made 
in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host State.75 While GAPP 15 does 
not add anything to SWF regulation, it expresses a commitment to comply with 
domestic regulations which seems in contradiction with GAPP 20. GAPP 20 provides 
that “the SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or inap-
propriate influence by the broader government in competing with private entities”, 
and should therefore comply with national competition or securities laws,76 as sug-
gested by GAPP 15. Surprisingly, a footnote accompanying the commentary of GAPP 
20 specifies that, “however, recipient countries may grant to SWFs certain privileges 
based on their governmental status, such as sovereign immunity and sovereign tax 
treatment.”77 Therefore, GAPP 20 suggests that SWFs intend to comply with domes-
tic law, but if a breach were to occur, SWFs reserve their right to invoke sovereign 
immunity which could bar domestic jurisdiction. Beyond the fact that it undermines 
the credibility of the commitment to comply with domestic laws, it also highlights 
another aporia in the Santiago Principles. On the one hand, SWF investment decisions 
should be guided by financial motives, and its managers should be independent from 
political authorities. On the other, this insinuates that the fund is still “sovereign 
enough” to benefit from the sovereign immunity protection. In other words, SWF 
investments should be perceived as jure gestionis acts, but should be treated as jure 
imperii acts from a legal standpoint: the art of saying one thing and then the very 
opposite!
An analysis of the Santiago Principles therefore leads to a disconcerting conclu-
sion. The provisions on the relations between the fund managers and the fund owner 
are related to domestic policy issues. Furthermore, the provisions on the relations 
between the fund and the recipient States are ineffective in addressing the latter’s 
concerns regarding possible use of SWF for political ends, with an additional risk of 
economic distortion. Credible commitments would include a real-time disclosure of 
all SWF investments and a waiver of their (perceived) entitled privileges and immu-
nities, at the minimum. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that the Santiago Principles 
are part of a broader public relations strategy devised by the funds themselves to 
body(ies) and follow clear rules and procedures, and be subject to ethics rules (see GAPP 14)” (San-
tiago Principles (n 12) 22).
75 OECD, International Investment Law – Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations, 76 
(Paris; OECD, 2008).
76 GAPP 15 (Explanation and commentary) (Santiago Principles (n 12) 19).
77 Santiago Principles (n 12) 22 (n 35).
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minimize the reluctance of some host States.78 For instance, the US executive branch 
actively promoted the Santiago Principles to overcome the hostility of the Congress. 
It is not surprising to notice that the then US Senator Hillary Clinton took a very 
critical position on SWFs before the Santiago Principles were adopted,79 but assumed 
a much more positive stance as US Secretary of State a few years later. In this regard, 
she pointed out that “when the international community grew worried about sovereign 
wealth funds, countries, institutions, and the funds themselves came together to agree 
on the Santiago Principles, a code of conduct designed to reassure all stakeholders 
that these funds would act responsibly.”80
4. The Santiago Principles: A Flawed Implementation
Given the inadequacy of the Santiago Principles to address the concerns raised by 
SWFs, the issue of their implementation should be of very limited interest. However, 
studying the implementation mechanisms reveals another objective of this instrument, 
namely to ensure a façade of respectability for SWFs.
Described as “a voluntary set of principles and practices that [SWFs] support and 
either have implemented or aspire to implement”,81 the Santiago Principles can be 
seen as a soft-law instrument. Their implementation primarily depends on the SWFs 
and their State of origin. The sole reference to Santiago Principles implementation is 
found in GAPP 24, which states that “a process of regular review of the implementa-
tion of the GAPP should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF”. Insofar as self-
assessment performed by the funds is of a limited interest considering its possible 
bias, attention needs to be directed towards the institutional mechanism established 
to promote implementation. In that respect, the Working Group that adopted the prin-
ciples decided to maintain an institutional platform by establishing the International 
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) in April 2009.82 In light of the soft-law 
dimension of the Santiago Principles, the IFSWF clearly stated from its inception that 
78 See Malathouni (n 35) 281 (noting that “the Santiago Principles constitute a compromise docu-
ment through which SWF holder countries attempted to appease the concerns of SWF recipient coun-
tries”).
79 See Laura Badian & Gregory Harrington, The Evolving Politics of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
in Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Legal, Tax and Economic Perspective, 138 (New York; PLI, 2010).
80 Speech of Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Economic Club of New York (14 October 2011) 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175552.htm> accessed 28 January 2016.
81 Santiago Principles (n 12) 5. The introductory note further points out that “the GAPP denotes 
general practices and principles, which are potentially achievable by countries at all levels of economic 
development. The GAPP is subject to provisions of intergovernmental agreements, and legal and regu-
latory requirements. Thus, the implementation of each principle of the GAPP is subject to applicable 
home country laws.”
82 IWGSWF, “Kuwait Declaration”: Establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (6 April 2009) <http://www.iwg-swf.org/index.php?home=kuwaitdec.php> accessed 28 January 
2016. This declaration states that the purpose of the Forum “will be to meet, exchange views on issues 
of common interest, and facilitate an understanding of the Santiago Principles and SWF activities.”
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“the Forum shall not be a formal supranational authority and its work shall not carry 
any legal force.”83 However, despite the good intentions displayed at that time, it turns 
out that the forum does not contribute to the implementation of the Santiago Principles 
by SWFs. Four salient elements can be mentioned to support this view.
Firstly, the forum’s limited membership significantly reduces its significance. 
Indeed, only 30 funds coming from 28 countries are represented.84 Several States 
with significant SWFs (Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Brunei) are not represented at all. In 
a more insidious way, some States owning several SWFs are represented only by one 
fund at the forum. Such is the case for China, whose China Investment Corporation 
(CIC) is an active IFSWF member, whereas its other significant fund, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), is not. The latter is responsible for 
managing China’s foreign exchange reserves, and its financial clout is equivalent to 
CIC. SAFE has carried out controversial investments indicating it acted on directives 
from the Chinese government.85 This suggests that the CIC acts as the star of Chinese 
sovereign investments, a situation preventing that any excessive attention is given to 
SAFE and its investments.
Second, there is a blatant lack of institutional control concerning the implementa-
tion of the Santiago Principles within the Forum. While “the Forum members shall 
be the SWFs who […] endorsed the Santiago Principles”, it appears that about a third 
of the members – particularly sovereign funds from the Middle East – have never 
been subject and never intended to conduct an external assessment of the implemen-
tation of the Santiago Principles. This is the case for the second largest sovereign 
wealth fund in the world, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), with more 
than 700 billion USD in assets. Its head – ironically – acted as the co-chair of the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds in charge of drafting the 
Santiago Principles.86 As to the Santiago Principles, the ADIA only published a state-
ment on its website noting that it “created a multi-disciplinary team to conduct a 
thorough internal compliance review”, and concluded that “through this self assess-
ment, we have verified and hereby confirm ADIA’s compliance with the Santiago 
Principles.”87 No evidence of such assessment has been published so far, and little 
credence should be given to such statements, which lack precision as to the degree 
of compliance with the Santiago Principles. Besides, independent studies have been 
conducted on the ADIA, and they indicate that in fact there is a poor level of account-
ability and transparency.88 Beyond the issue of compliance with the Santiago Prin-
ciples, some authors have also pointed to the “inactive membership” of some funds 
83 Ibid.
84 The list of IFSWF members is available at <http://www.ifswf.org/members> accessed 28 Janu-
ary 2016.
85 For the precedent concerning the investment in bonds issued by Costa Rica, see (n 2–9) and 
accompanying text.
86 Adamson (n 68).
87 Statement made on the ADIA’s website available at <http://www.adia.ae/en/Governance/San
tiago_Principles.aspx> accessed 28 January 2016. 
88 Truman (n 12) 76. See also Behrendt (n28) 6, 9. 
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within the Forum, underlining that “such behavior reflects adversely on the other 
members and on the credibility of the forum as an institution.”89
Third, several aspects of IFSWF operations reinforce the perception of a lack of 
commitment and seriousness. Indeed, while it intends to promote transparency of 
sovereign funds, the Forum distinguishes itself by its opacity as well as discretion.90 
For instance, it did not publish any information between May 2010 and April 2011, 
only ending its silence for the announcement of its upcoming general assembly.91 On 
this occasion, an SWF specialist ironically noted: “This is Just In: The IFSWF Said 
Something”, while wondering at the same time “how should we, the public, under-
stand SWFs based on eleven months of silence?”.92 This silence was all the more 
disconcerting that, during that period, the UN Security Council decided to freeze the 
assets of one of the Forum members, the Libyan Investment Authority.93 Since then, 
the IFSWF has improved its institutional visibility, at least quantitatively, by publish-
ing about ten short communiqués every year, mainly addressing matters of marginal 
importance (annual meetings, new members, relocation of the secretariat, etc.).94
Fourth and lastly, t here is a significant gap between the values the Santiago Prin-
ciples intend to promote95 and the stance tak en by some officials exercising substan-
tial responsibilities in the Forum. The most striking example is certainly that of Mr 
Jin Liqun, former head of the CIC and former IFSWF chairman. Two questionable 
statements he made are insightful in determining a far-reaching contradiction between 
good intentions enshrined in the Santiago Principles and their actual application. Call-
ing into question the welfare State systems in Europe, he declared in November 2011, 
in the wake of the European debt crisis that, “if you look at the troubles which have 
happened in European societies, this is purely because of the accumulated troubles 
89 Sarah Bagnall and Edwin M Truman, IFSWF Report on Compliance with the Santiago Prin-
ciples: Admirable but Flawed Transparency 5 Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy 
Brief No. 11–14 (August 2011) <http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb11–14.pdf> accessed 28 Janu-
ary 2016. See also, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, QIA Leads Fund Rankings for Missing Santiago Govern-
ance Standards Financial Times (27 October 2014); Simon Clark, Mia Lamar, and Bradley Hope, The 
Trouble With Sovereign-Wealth Funds Wall Street Journal (22 December 2015) (noting that the IFSWF 
Chairman “has little power to get funds to comply, as membership in the forum doesn’t require funds to 
implement the high standards he is urging. At least five of the 29 forum members don’t publish public 
annual reports. At least four don’t disclose their asset size”).
90 See also, Kratsas and Truby (n 35) 132.
91 For the communiqués published by the IFSWF, see <http://www.ifswf.org/news> accessed 28 
January 2016.
92 See <https://oxfordswf.wordpress.com/2011/04/13/this-just-in-the-ifswf-said-something> 
accessed 28 January 2016. The blog of this author has been relocated to: <http://www.institutional
investor.com/Blogs-and-Columns-Ashby-Monks-Avenue-of-Giants.html#> accessed 28 January 2016.
93 See paras 19–21 of UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973.
94 See also Malathouni (n 35) 285 (noting that many documents published by the IFSWF are only 
accessible to IFSWF members).
95 As pointed out by the IFSWF: “the Forum is open to new members and welcomes sovereign 
funds willing to endorse the Santiago Principles and the values on which the Forum rests” (IFSWF, 
Santiago Principles – 15 Case Studies 8 (2014) <http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/blog/files/San-
tiagoP15CaseStudies1_1.pdf> accessed 28 January 2016). 
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of the worn-out welfare society. The labour laws induce sloth and indolence rather 
than hard work.”96 He had also declared earlier that “China cannot be expected to 
bail out the Eurozone unless it opens hurdles to China and other high-growth 
markets.”97 The first statement could have been made by any private investor unwill-
ing to invest in economies perceived as less efficient. While targeting an economic 
and social model and carrying particular weight due to his position, the first statement 
suggests the CIC is guided purely by economic and financial motives – and would 
thus be compatible with the Santiago Principles. The second statement is more con-
troversial: it suggests that CIC investments in the Eurozone are contingent on a change 
within the EU and the foreign policies of its Member States; specifically, more Chi-
nese access to European markets. Such a declaration would be nonsensical if made 
by a private investor, and this indicates that CIC investments are also guided by 
political and geopolitical motives which are certainly absent from its investment 
policy, and surely goes against the very spirit of the Santiago Principles.
Overall, the IFSWF as a cooperation platform for SWFs appears more akin to a 
“country club” that exclusively serves the interests of its members than a genuine 
international institution willing to impose discipline for the general interest.98 There-
fore, it seems extremely difficult to agree that the IFSWF “serves a global role of 
ownership and guardianship of the Santiago Principles.”99
5. Conclusions
Ultimately, the genesis and the content of the Santiago Principles as well as the insti-
tutional framework allegedly dedicated to their implementation clearly show that this 
enterprise rather constitutes that of a public relations stunt to improve Western econ-
omies’ perceptions of SWFs. Further confirmation is given by the statements of the 
former head of the CIC that “implementing the Santiago Principles can help a par-
ticular sovereign wealth fund to be better understood and accepted in the countries in 
which it invests.”100 The Santiago Principles shall neither be regarded as a genuine 
form of international regulation101 nor as an international standard,102 but rather as a 
veneer of respectability.
96 Tony Barber, Enter the Technocrats Financial Times (Asia Edition) 7 (12 November 2011).
97 A Chinese Lesson for Europe Financial Times (Asia Edition) 2 (30 September 2011).
98 One report dedicated to the implementation of the Santiago Principles pointed out in this respect 
that “the original intention was for the report to be a resource for members to learn from each other, 
which was one of the purposes of the establishment of the IFSWF” (IFSWF, IFSWF Members’ Experi-
ences in the Application of the Santiago Principles 45 (7 July 2011) <http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/
files/press-release/files/2011%20Report%20-%20Application%20of%20the%20Santiago%20Principles.
pdf> accessed 28 January 2016).
99 IFSWF (n 95) 8.
100 Adamson (n 68).
101 The IFSWF recently stated that the Santiago Principles constitute a “generally agreed global 
framework for SWFs” (IFSWF (n 95) 8).
102 See n 52 and accompanying text. 
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This conclusion does not insinuate that sovereign funds, despite their compliance 
with the Santiago Principles, should be perceived as necessarily having political 
motives. However, it does assert that compliance with this instrument does not pre-
clude a sovereign fund form carrying out investments based on political motives. 
Insofar as they do not adequately address the main concern of the host States of sov-
ereign investments, the Principles should be considered futile. Eventually, created by 
sovereign funds for their own use, the Santiago Principles give us the opportunity to 
reflect on Adam Smith’s warning made more than two centuries ago on what is now 
referred to as self-regulation:
“The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade […] is 
always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public 
[…]. The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from 
this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never 
to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with 
the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an 
order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public.”103
103 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Book I, Chap. IX).
